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Tort Law Implications of Compelled Physician Speech
NADIA N. SAWICKI*

Abortion-specific informed consent laws in many states compel physicians to
communicate state-mandated information that is arguably inaccurate, immaterial,
and inconsistent with their professional obligations. These laws face ongoing First
Amendment challenges as violations of the constitutional right against compelled
speech. This Article argues that laws compelling physician speech also pose
significant problems that should concern scholars of tort law.
State laws that impose tort liability on physicians who refuse to communicate a
state-mandated message often do so by deviating from foundational principles of tort
law. Not only do they change the substantive disclosure duties of physicians under
informed consent law, but many modify or even reject the procedural requirements
for tort liability. Most significantly, these laws relieve prospective plaintiffs of the
burden of proving two fundamental elements of negligence—causation in fact and
proximate causation. Thus, when states compel physician speech for political
reasons, their actions challenge not only constitutional principles, but tort principles
as well.
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INTRODUCTION
Abortion informed consent laws have been the subject of much political and
scholarly debate. These state laws require physicians to communicate information
that may be scientifically inaccurate or medically irrelevant to patients seeking
abortions. Among legal scholars, the primary issue of concern is whether these
informed consent requirements are constitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.1
Scholars of health law, public policy, medicine, and medical ethics have also
turned their attention to abortion informed consent laws. Many have argued that the
disclosures required by these laws are inconsistent with the ethical and legal
principles of informed consent, and that by imposing additional requirements, state
legislatures are co-opting medical practice for political goals.2 Recent tort
scholarship questions whether state-specific compelled speech requirements might
spill over to modify the medical standard of care nationwide.3
In this Article, I consider a different issue at the intersection of compelled speech
and tort law. Rather than focusing primarily on the substantive content of
legislatively mandated abortion disclosures, I highlight the ways in which these laws
may undermine the fundamental procedural requirements of tort litigation. Every
first-year law student is taught that the elements of negligence are duty, breach, cause
in fact, proximate causation, and damages. However, these foundational elements are
called into question by laws that compel physicians to communicate state-mandated
information about abortion and punish them for failing to do so, even in the absence
of proof that there was a causal relationship between breach and injury.
Certainly, legislatures have the authority to reject common law tort principles and
craft their own standards for liability. However, the abandonment of actual and
proximate causation as elements of an informed consent claim in the abortion context
has broader implications for negligence law generally. These laws set a dangerous

1. See infra Section I.B.
2. See infra Section I.C.
3. See Katherine Shaw & Alex Stein, Abortion, Informed Consent, and Regulatory
Spillover, 92 IND. L.J. 1 (2016).
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precedent by allowing legislatures to dismantle the fundamental elements of tort
liability in order to achieve political and ideological goals.
I. COMPELLED PHYSICIAN SPEECH: ABORTION DISCLOSURE LAWS
Under common law, physicians have a duty to secure a patient’s informed consent
before proceeding with medical treatment. Generally, tort law imposes a duty to
disclose the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis, the risks and benefits of the proposed
treatment, and the risks and benefits of alternative treatments (including the risks and
benefits of forgoing treatment).4 This duty exists across all areas of medical practice,
regardless of the patient’s condition or the proposed treatment.5 Just as medical
custom generally sets the standard of care in medical malpractice litigation,6 common
law informed consent requirements have historically been grounded in the medical
profession’s customary practice.7
Some states have codified these general disclosure duties, providing statutory
reinforcement for the common law obligations grounded in medical custom.8
However, in recent years, many state legislatures have passed informed consent laws
imposing additional disclosure duties that deviate from the customary practices of
the medical community.
It should come as no surprise that these new informed consent laws apply only in
the context of one controversial medical service—abortion.9 Just as the political
rhetoric surrounding abortion has translated into targeted legal and regulatory
requirements for facilities that perform abortions10 and legal limitations on the
options available for termination of pregnancy,11 it has also affected the freedom that
physicians have to communicate with patients seeking abortions.

4. Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the Boundaries of
Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 831 (2016).
5. Historically, however, the duty to secure informed consent has often been limited to
procedures that involve violation of bodily integrity, such as surgery. Id. at 832.
6. BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS
& ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW 77 (3d ed. 2015).
7. Sawicki, supra note 4, at 829. Over time, however, about half of jurisdictions shifted
to a patient-based standard. Id.
8. See id. at 831 (citing representative statutes).
9. Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in
Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1602 (2008) (“Abortion is one of the few medical
procedures governed by specific statutory informed consent requirements.”); see also NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.12(2) (West 2010) (“Nothing in section 28-327 [informed consent
provisions] shall be construed as defining a standard of care for any medical procedure other
than an induced abortion.”).
10. See Marshall H. Medoff, State Abortion Politics and TRAP Abortion Laws, 33 J.
WOMEN, POL., & POL’Y 239 (2012); Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) Laws,
GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-canuse/targeted-regulation-abortion-providers-trap-laws [https://perma.cc/8CRL-X7FQ].
11. These may include prohibitions on abortion after a specific gestational age, partial
birth abortion bans, restrictions on emergency contraception, and others.
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A. Abortion Disclosure and Consent Laws
Currently, the majority of U.S. states have abortion-specific informed consent
laws.12 These laws, sometimes called “Women’s Right to Know Acts,” require
physicians to go beyond the traditional disclosures required under the common law
of informed consent.13 They identify additional information that legislators believe
is important to a patient’s abortion decision and mandate that physicians
communicate this information whether or not they believe it is medically appropriate.
While a comprehensive summary of disclosure requirements is beyond the scope of
this Article, there are a few categories of state-mandated disclosures that have been
highlighted as particularly problematic by commentators in law, medicine, and
ethics.14

12. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 1, 2021),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/counseling-and-waiting-periods-abortion
[https://perma.cc/8KJP-AB48] (identifying thirty-three states with abortion-specific informed
consent laws); see also Mandatory Counseling for Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 22,
2020),
https://www.guttmacher.org/evidence-you-can-use/mandatory-counseling-abortion
[https://perma.cc/S6MA-SXQW] (describing requirements of abortion informed consent
laws).
13. See generally Dresser, supra note 9, at 1617–20 (describing categories of abortion
disclosures and explaining that none are required under standard informed consent doctrine);
Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the
Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, 10 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 6, 7 (2007)
(noting that abortion informed consent laws “often do little to further the underlying values of
the consent process, and sometimes are even directly at odds with them”); Zita Lazzarini,
South Dakota’s Abortion Script—Threatening the Physician-Patient Relationship, 359 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2189 (2008) (describing South Dakota’s law as “unique in ways that should
cause concern to physicians, patients, and protectors of the physician-patient relationship”);
Howard Minkoff & Mary Faith Marshall, Government-Scripted Consent: When Medical
Ethics and Law Collide, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21 (2009) (describing abortion-specific
informed consent laws as abrogating the process of informed consent); Harper Jean Tobin,
Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent, Deference, and Fetal Pain Laws,
17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 111 (2008) (arguing that these laws “abandon well-settled
principles of informed consent . . . in favor of legislative judgments”); Ian Vanderwalker,
Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of
Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2012) (describing biased abortion disclosure laws
as exceeding the scope of traditional informed consent, and as an example of abortion
exceptionalism). Cf. Nadia N. Sawicki, Abortion Informed Consent Laws: More Light, Less
Heat, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (2011) (arguing that the doctrine of informed consent
inherently takes into account social values and gives physicians discretion in deciding what to
communicate to their patients, and that although abortion informed consent laws are in many
ways unique, they could also be viewed as “explicit manifestations of the sort of value
judgments that have long been implicit in the law and doctrine of informed consent”).
14. See Dresser, supra note 9, at 1609 (grouping the supplemental information required
by abortion informed consent laws into three categories: “(1) risk information that is
unsupported by medical evidence, (2) graphic material about the fetus, and (3) information
regarding assistance to women deciding whether to continue their pregnancies”).
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First, many abortion disclosure laws require physicians to communicate
information that is medically or scientifically inaccurate.15 Examples include
statements that abortion is linked to an increased risk of infertility,16 breast cancer,17
psychological harm, and suicide;18 that medication abortion is reversible;19 that

15. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 12 (identifying several
states that inaccurately portray the risks of future infertility, breast cancer, and negative
emotional response, and that provide inaccurate information on medication abortion); see also
Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175, 1175–76 (2014);
Dresser, supra note 9, at 1609–10; Gold & Nash, supra note 13, at 11; Minkoff & Marshall,
supra note 13, at 21; Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The
Medical Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 GUTTMACHER POL’Y
REV. 6 (2006); Sawicki, supra note 13, at 12–13.
16. Vanderwalker, supra note 13, at 14 (describing research contradicting compelled
disclosures about risks of infertility associated with abortion).
17. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 12; Richardson & Nash,
supra note 15, at 7–8 (finding that in five states, state-mandated abortion counseling materials
include “inaccurate[] assert[ions] [of] a link between abortion and an increased risk of breast
cancer”); see also Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048,
1072 (D.S.D. 2011) (finding that statute requiring disclosure of any “risk factor associated
with abortion” would require physicians to communicate “misleading” information regarding
breast cancer risk); Dresser, supra note 9, at 1609–10 n.79 (citing medical evidence that
abortion is not correlated with an increased risk of breast cancer); Vanderwalker, supra note
13, at 18–19 (describing evidence contradicting claims of a causal relationship between
abortion and breast cancer).
18. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1048 (D.
Neb. 2010) (granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of a bill that would require
providers to disclose “any adverse physical, psychological, or emotional reaction that is
reported in a peer-reviewed journal to be statistically associated with abortion such that there
is less than a five percent probability (P < .05) that the result is due to chance” on the grounds
that it would “require medical providers to give untruthful, misleading and irrelevant
information to patients”); Richardson & Nash, supra note 15, at 8–9 (finding that in nineteen
states, state-mandated abortion counseling materials include unsupported information on the
psychological effects of abortion, including the risk of “postabortion traumatic stress
syndrome” and suicide); see also Corbin, supra note 15, at 1178–87 (describing the “abortion
syndrome that wasn’t there”); Dresser, supra note 9, at 1610 (noting that there is little
empirical evidence to support “postabortion syndrome” causing psychological trauma);
Vanderwalker, supra note 13, at 15–18 (describing evidence contradicting claims of a causal
relationship between abortion and psychological problems). But see Planned Parenthood
Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding, as truthful and not
misleading, South Dakota informed consent law requiring disclosure that abortion carries an
“increased risk” of suicide and suicidal ideation).
19. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 12 (identifying eight states
with statutes requiring disclosure of such information, some of which have been enjoined);
see also Am. Med. Ass’n v. Stenehjem, 412 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D.N.D. 2019) (granting
preliminary injunction against “misleading” abortion informed consent statute requiring
physicians to inform patients that it may be possible to reverse medical abortions); Planned
Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Brnovich, 172 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1098–99 (D. Ariz. 2016)
(addressing a challenge to Arizona law requiring physicians to inform patients that it may be
possible to reverse a medication abortion, which the plaintiffs claim is “false, misleading,
and/or irrelevant”); Planned Parenthood of Tenn. & N. Miss. v. Slatery, 523 F. Supp. 3d 985
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fetuses at a gestational age of more than nineteen weeks may be able to survive
outside the womb;20 and that fetuses are able to feel pain at early stages of fetal
development.21
Second, some state laws require physicians to communicate information that
either explicitly or implicitly speaks to the moral status of the fetus. Most explicitly,
state legislatures in South Dakota,22 North Dakota,23 and Kansas24 have drafted
scripts that doctors must communicate, including language that “the abortion will
terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”25 Indiana
requires physicians to counsel women seeking abortions that life begins at
conception.26 Other states include similar language in the state-drafted printed

(M.D. Tenn. 2021) (granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of informed consent
statute requiring disclosure of reversibility of abortion, on the grounds that it is untruthful
and/or misleading); Khadijah Z. Bhatti, Antoinette T. Nguyen & Gretchen S. Stuart,
Medication Abortion Reversal: Science and Politics Meet, 218 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 315 (2018) (finding a paucity of evidence for medication abortion reversal, and
suggesting that physicians and policymakers “dispel bad science and misinformation and
advocate against medical abortion reversal legislation”).
20. See Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1203–04
(M.D. Ala. 2002) (noting conflicting evidence as to the accuracy of this statement, and
concluding that such a disclosure is only constitutional if the physician also informs the patient
“about the meaning of the term survival as well as the nature and extent of any possible
survival[,]” including the fact that the survival may be “momentary”).
21. Richardson & Nash, supra note 15, at 9 (finding that in five states, state-mandated
abortion counseling materials include information about the fetus’s ability to feel pain, which
the authors describe as “arguably the most egregious example of medical inaccuracy in state
abortion counseling materials”); see also Whole Woman’s Health All. v. Hill, 493 F. Supp. 3d
694 (S.D. Ind. 2020), order clarified by Whole Woman’s Health All. v. Rokita, No. 1:18-cv01904-SEB-MJD, 2021 WL 252721 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2021) (finding genuine issues of
material fact as to whether fetal pain disclosure constituted an undue burden); Tobin, supra
note 13, at 113–14 (describing fetal pain disclosure laws as “misrepresent[ing] current medical
knowledge”); Vanderwalker, supra note 13, at 21–25 (showing that many fetal pain
disclosures are misleading).
22. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2011) (requiring, in sections (c) and (d),
the disclosure that “the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human
being and that the relationship enjoys protection under the United States Constitution and
under the laws of South Dakota” and that “by having an abortion, her existing relationship and
her existing constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be terminated”), upheld
in Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735–36 (8th Cir. 2008)
and Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE 14-02.1-02(11)(a)(2) (2013).
24. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(b)(5) (2017).
25. See Sawicki, supra note 13, at 8–9.
26. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E) (West 2021). See Planned Parenthood of Ind.
v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 794 F. Supp. 2d 892, 914 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (upholding
the disclosure as being “biological” rather than “metaphysical”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
699 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2012); Whole Woman’s Health All. v. Hill, 493 F. Supp. 3d 694, 726,
751–52 (S.D. Ind. 2020) (finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether this disclosure
constituted an undue burden, on the grounds that it “cloaks personal or religious beliefs
regarding life's beginning as scientific, medical fact as to the formation of a developing embryo
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materials that doctors are required to share with patients.27 Commentators have
described these statutory requirements as problematic because they require doctors
to communicate ideological messages rather than factual medical information.28
Indeed, some courts have reached similar conclusions. For example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected a claim alleging that doctors have a common law duty to
inform patients of “the scientific and medical fact that [an embryo is] a complete,
separate, unique and irreplaceable human being” and that abortion would result in
“killing an existing human being.”29 The court described this disclosure as relating
to “moral, philosophical, and religious beliefs” rather than “medical facts,” and
therefore not part of common law informed consent requirements.30 In Indiana,
where state law requires disclosure that “human physical life begins when a human
ovum is fertilized by a human sperm,” a federal district court rejected the state’s
claim that this disclosure was “medically accurate, scientifically uncontroversial, and
not ideologically charged,” noting that there was no “biological explanation or
justification for this provision.”31
More implicit messages about moral status come from requirements that health
care providers perform ultrasounds that are not medically necessary for women
seeking abortions and display and describe the ultrasound images regardless of the
woman’s wishes. Many commentators32 (and one federal appeals court33) have

or fetus” and “requires transmission of a ‘deeply ideological’ opinion under the guise of
medical fact”), order clarified by Whole Woman’s Health All. v. Rokita, No. 1:18-cv-01904SEB-MJD, 2021 WL 252721 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2021).
27. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 188.027.1(2) (2019), upheld in Doe v. Parson, 567 S.W.3d
625 (Mo. 2019).
28. See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 959–60; Lauren R. Robbins,
Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say ‘Ideology’: Physicians and the First Amendment, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 162 (2009); Minkoff & Marshall, supra note 13; Lazzarini, supra note
13; Vanderwalker, supra note 13, at 25–28.
29. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 416 (N.J. 2007).
30. Id.
31. Hill, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 751–52.
32. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws:
The First Amendment’s Limits on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347
(2013) (describing ultrasound requirements as unconstitutionally “commandeer[ing]
physicians into spreading the state's ideological belief that pregnancies should be carried to
term”); Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 397 (2008) (arguing that requiring display of fetal
imagery is a politically-motivated attempt to transform the woman’s conception of the moral
status of the fetus); James Rocha, Autonomous Abortions: The Inhibiting of Women’s
Autonomy Through Legal Ultrasound Requirements, 22 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 35 (2012)
(arguing that ultrasound requirements aimed at communicating the ontological status of the
fetus inhibit women’s autonomous decision-making).
33. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014) (affirming injunction of
requirement that physicians perform ultrasound, display sonogram, and describe fetus to
women seeking abortions on the grounds that such disclosures are “ideological”). But see Tex.
Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573, 580 (5th Cir. 2012)
(affirming constitutionality of statute requiring physicians to “perform and display a sonogram
of the fetus” and “make audible the heart auscultation of the fetus for the woman to hear” as
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criticized these requirements as attempts by the state to imbue the fetus with an
inherent moral status in a manner that is inconsistent with the goals of informed
consent. As several scholars have noted, in a society where ultrasounds are routinely
used by parents to communicate the joy of an anticipated child, these images are far
from objective and can be emotionally triggering for those wishing to terminate a
pregnancy.34
Finally, many state laws require physicians to disclose information that is not
material to a patient’s evaluation of medical risks and benefits. Common law limits
informed consent disclosures to those relating to the medical risks and benefits of the
procedure and its alternatives. Courts have almost uniformly rejected the idea that
informed consent requires disclosure of information other than the risks and benefits
inherent in the medical procedure itself—for example, its financial, legal, or ethical
implications.35 However, these types of disclosures are common in abortion informed
consent laws. Many, for example, require physicians to share information about
social and financial support resources available to women who choose to proceed
with a pregnancy, including child support, adoption services, pregnancy help centers,
and Medicaid benefits.36 While such information might be practically valuable to
women seeking abortions, it is far beyond the scope of what informed consent
jurisprudence considers “material” to medical decision-making. Several other
disclosures required by some state laws—including the description of ultrasound
images, anatomical descriptions, explanation of the stages of gestational
development, and statements about the fetus’s status as a human being—also do not
relate to the medical risks and benefits of abortion and therefore fall outside what is

being truthful and not misleading, rather than ideological); Hill, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 750
(granting state’s motion for summary judgment regarding ultrasound requirement on the
grounds that it does not impose a significant burden); EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v.
Beshear, 920 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2019) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to ultrasound
requirement).
34. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of
Social Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2008)
(citing Blackmun’s concurrence in Casey as recognizing “power of such visual images in
influencing, even biasing, an individual's decisions”); Dresser, supra note 9, at 1617 (noting
that “informed consent doctrine does not require graphic language and vivid pictures designed
to discourage patients from choosing a medical intervention”); Sanger, supra note 32, at 401
(describing anthropological perspectives on fetal imagery); CATHERINE MILLS, FUTURES OF
REPRODUCTION 101–21 (David N. Weisstub ed., 2011) (arguing that ultrasound images have
both “emotive” and “ethical” force).
35. Sawicki, supra note 4, at 846–58; see also Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416 (N.J.
2007); Allyson M. Rucinski, Finding the Middle Ground: Acuna v. Turkish and the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of a Doctor’s Role Under the Doctrine of Informed
Consent in the Digital Age, 29 PACE L. REV. 797 (2009) (describing the court’s decision in
Acuna as reflective of common law doctrine regarding what constitutes material information
for the purpose of informed consent).
36. Richardson & Nash, supra note 15, at 10 (finding that materials in twenty states
provide “directories with contact information for resources that offer a range of support
services, including adoption services, financial assistance, child care, health services and
prenatal care[,]” including crisis pregnancy centers).
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typically required under common law informed consent doctrine.37 Moreover, many
of these disclosures convey information that is “obvious,” which is exempted from
disclosure under the common law of informed consent.38
B. Constitutional Challenges
Constitutional challenges to abortion informed consent laws—whether on First
Amendment free speech39 or Fourteenth Amendment reproductive privacy40 grounds
—have had mixed results.41 While these are two independent constitutional claims,
as a practical matter they are hard to disentangle in light of Supreme Court
jurisprudence on compelled speech in the abortion context.42
Tort claims for failure of informed consent are essentially malpractice claims
based on physician speech. Although the historical view has been that the First

37. Vanderwalker, supra note 13, at 19–21 (explaining the irrelevance of many statepublished abortion counseling materials). For additional cases speaking to irrelevant
disclosures in abortion informed consent laws, see Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247, 251
(8th Cir. 1978) (holding that a law requiring that women be told that their parental rights would
be terminated if their abortions resulted in live births would never be relevant to early
pregnancies which could not result in live births); Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Riley, 318
F. Supp. 2d 1109 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (invalidating disclosures relating to adoption and early
childhood care as being not relevant to women with ectopic pregnancies or lethal fetal
anomalies).
38. See Post, supra note 28, at 954 (criticizing the “human being disclosures” on
obviousness grounds, and noting that “[i]t hardly seems plausible that a woman could be
confused about whether she is carrying the biological fetus of a zebra, a raccoon, or a bat”);
Robbins, supra note 28, at 190–91 (commenting that these disclosures are unnecessary
because they are obvious and that states imposing such requirements “ma[ke] it seem like a
woman who voluntarily goes to a clinic to get this procedure has no clue about the purpose of
her visit,” or that “women do not understand the basic elements of reproduction”).
39. See discussion infra Section I.B. First Amendment speech claims have also been
brought in connection with the imposition of fees on health care providers to pay for the
distribution of state-mandated pro-childbirth materials. Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v.
Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
40. See, e.g., Falls Church Med. Ctr., LLC v. Oliver, 412 F. Supp. 3d 668, 700 (E.D. Va.
2019) (finding that informed consent statute requiring pre-abortion ultrasound does not impose
a substantial obstacle to accessing abortion); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 492 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding required disclosures about services available to women seeking abortions, and
consent provisions regarding ultrasound and heartbeat, do not have the purpose or effect of
imposing an undue burden on the woman’s right to choose).
41. Challenges have also been raised on First Amendment religious freedom grounds.
See, e.g., Doe v. Parson, 960 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 874 (2020)
(rejecting Establishment Clause and Free Exercise challenges to abortion informed consent
requirements).
42. See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden
Preemption, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1047 (2014) (arguing that the Casey “undue burden”
standard for reproductive privacy due process claims has effectively overtaken courts’ analysis
of all constitutional claims in the reproductive health context, including compelled speech
claims).
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Amendment is inapplicable to physician speech,43 modern courts and commentators
have recognized that the state’s authority to regulate the practice of medicine is not
absolute, and that physician speech is entitled to some constitutional protections.44
The precise scope of physicians’ First Amendment rights, however, is not clear.
The most authoritative statement on physicians’ speech rights comes from
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, where the Supreme Court succinctly dismissed a First
Amendment challenge to Pennsylvania’s abortion informed consent law, finding it
to be a reasonable regulation of the practice of medicine.45 However, the only two
cases cited by the Court in its First Amendment analysis—Wooley v. Maynard and
Whalen v. Roe—were inapplicable in the context of First Amendment challenges to
professional speech.46 Earlier in the Casey opinion, the Court expressed support for
“truthful, nonmisleading information” that is “relevant” to a woman’s decision about
whether to terminate her pregnancy—but it did so in the context of analyzing the
Fourteenth Amendment reproductive privacy claim rather than the First Amendment
claim.47

43. See Post, supra note 28, at 950–51 (concluding that traditional First Amendment
values “seem to carry very little force” in the context of professional speech by physicians).
44. See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 (2016)
(arguing that First Amendment protection of professional speech is necessarily tied to the
profession as a “knowledge community”); B. Jessie Hill, The First Amendment and the Politics
of Reproductive Health Care, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 103 (2016) (arguing that courts’ First
Amendment analyses of compelled physician speech are linked to their understanding of
whether reproductive health care is primarily medical in nature); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What
the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality of Persuasive Government
Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. L. REV. 855 (2010) (arguing that abortion disclosure laws
and tobacco labeling laws should receive the same treatment under the First Amendment);
Keighley, supra note 32 (challenging abortion ultrasound laws as compelled ideological
speech); Post, supra note 28 (comparing First Amendment restrictions on commercial speech
and professional speech in the context of abortion disclosure laws); Robbins, supra note 28
(challenging abortion disclosure laws as compelling misleading and ideological speech);
Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and
Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2016) (analyzing the boundaries of physicians’
First Amendment rights when communicating with patients); Sonia M. Suter, The First
Amendment and Physician Speech in Reproductive Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
22 (2015) (arguing that heightened scrutiny should apply to abortion informed consent laws);
Tobin, supra note 13 (arguing that compelled abortion disclosures should be subject to nondeferential judicial review of their accuracy and fairness under the Casey standard).
45. “All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment right of a
physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner
mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977), but
only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603, 97 S.Ct. 869, 878, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). We see
no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information
mandated by the State here.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884
(1992).
46. See Sawicki, supra note 44, at 18.
47. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882–83; see also EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear,
920 F.3d 421, 450 (6th Cir. 2019) (Donald, J., dissenting) (“The analysis in Casey that the
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Critics have described the Court’s approach in Casey as “puzzling,”48 “cryptic,”49
“oblique[],”50 and of “little guidance,”51 particularly in the context of compelled
physician speech outside the abortion context.52 Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, no
consistent or coherent doctrine has coalesced as to how to evaluate First Amendment
claims by physicians generally53 or compelled speech challenges to informed consent
requirements more specifically.
When it comes to abortion-specific informed consent laws, however, courts most
commonly apply Casey’s truthful, not misleading, and relevant standard.54 This
approach has continued even after the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in National

majority relies upon applies to an undue burden challenge, not a First Amendment
challenge.”).
48. Post, supra note 28, at 946.
49. Haupt, supra note 44, at 1259.
50. B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59,
60 (2015).
51. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 773 (1999).
52. See generally Sawicki, supra note 44. Beyond the context of informed consent to
abortion discussed below, courts have also considered physicians’ First Amendment rights in
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 848 F.3d 1293, 1319 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding that
elements of a Florida law banning doctors from inquiring about patients’ gun ownership
constituted content- and speaker-based restrictions violating the First Amendment); Pickup v.
Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1236 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding California ban on sexual orientation
conversion therapy for children under rational basis review); King v. Governor of New Jersey,
767 F.3d 216, 246–47 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding New Jersey ban on sexual orientation
conversion therapy under intermediate scrutiny); Otto v. City of Boca Raton, 981 F.3d 854,
879–80 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding that ban on sexual orientation change therapy was an
unconstitutional content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny); Conant v. Walters, 309
F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “professional speech may be entitled to ‘the
strongest protection our Constitution has to offer’” and enjoining, as content-based, a federal
policy that would revoke a physician's license on the basis of the physician's recommendation
of medical marijuana); Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State, 722 S.E.2d 722, 724–25 (Ga. 2012)
(applying strict scrutiny to enjoin a law prohibiting doctors from offering assistance in the
commission of suicide); State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 22 (Minn. 2014) (applying
strict scrutiny to enjoin a law prohibiting doctors from encouraging or advising patients to
commit suicide); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Schneider, 484 F. Supp. 3d 596, 609
(N.D. Ill. 2020) (finding a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether a requirement that
healthcare providers discuss services that they oppose on conscience grounds—including
abortion, contraception, and sterilization—violates their First Amendment rights).
53. Carl H. Coleman, Regulating Physician Speech, 97 N.C. L. REV. 843, 843 (2019)
(describing the “hodgepodge of approaches” taken by lower courts in the absence of a clear
constitutional standard).
54. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th
Cir. 2012) (upholding ultrasound and heartbeat requirements under the “truthful,
nonmisleading, and relevant” standard); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds,
686 F.3d 889, 904–05, 907 (8th Cir. 2012) (upholding risk of suicide disclosure under
“truthful, non-misleading, and relevant” standard). But see Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238,
255–56 (4th Cir. 2014) (enjoining ultrasound requirements under intermediate scrutiny).
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Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,55 which concerned compelled
speech relating to abortion but did not establish a First Amendment standard for
evaluating informed consent laws.56
However, despite lower courts’ relatively consistent reliance on the Casey
standard when considering First Amendment challenges to abortion informed
consent laws, there is little consistency in the outcomes from applying that standard
across the country. Courts have reached divergent conclusions as to whether
compelled disclosures of “human being” language,57 risk information about
suicide,58 and ultrasound images59 are constitutionally permissible.60

55. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018)
[hereinafter NIFLA] (enjoining California law requiring crisis pregnancy centers to make
certain disclosures as a content-based regulation of speech). The Supreme Court in NIFLA
held that there are only two exceptions to the application of strict scrutiny to content-based
speech regulations: “laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial
information in their ‘commercial speech’” and laws regulating professional conduct that
“incidentally involve[] speech.” Id. at 2372 (citing Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns.,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) and Casey, 505 U.S. at 884)).
56. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Schneider, 484 F. Supp. 3d 596, 614 (N.D.
Ill. 2020) (“There is disagreement among courts regarding the level of scrutiny to be applied
to informed-consent laws, and NIFLA did not address whether rational basis or intermediate
scrutiny was required.”).
57. See Whole Woman’s Health All. v. Hill, 493 F. Supp. 3d 694, 751–52 (S.D. Ind. 2020)
(enjoining “human being” disclosure as misleading); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D.
v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D.S.D. 2005), vacated and remanded, 530 F.3d 724,
735–38 (8th Cir. 2008) (enjoining “human being” disclosure as compelled ideological speech);
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976–77 (D.S.D. 2009);
Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 667–68 (8th Cir. 2011)
(upholding “human being” disclosure as being truthful, not misleading, and relevant).
58. See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds 530 F.3d 724, 738 (8th Cir.
2008); Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, at 898-99 (8th Cir.
2012) (upholding, as truthful and not misleading, a South Dakota informed consent law
requiring disclosure that abortion carries an “increased risk” of suicide and suicidal ideation);
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1048 (D. Neb. 2010)
(enjoining requirements that providers disclose “any adverse physical, psychological, or
emotional reaction that is reported in a peer-reviewed journal to be statistically associated with
abortion such that there is less than a five percent probability (P < .05) that the result is due to
chance” on the grounds that it would “require medical providers to give untruthful, misleading
and irrelevant information”).
59. See EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr. v. Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 446 (6th Cir. 2019)
(upholding ultrasound and heartbeat requirements as “truthful and nonmisleading”); Tex.
Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 2012)
(upholding ultrasound and heartbeat requirements as being truthful and not misleading, rather
than ideological); Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 255–56 (4th Cir. 2014) (enjoining
ultrasound requirements under intermediate scrutiny on the grounds that such disclosures are
“ideological”); Whole Woman’s Health All. v. Hill, 493 F. Supp. 3d 694, 750 (S.D. Ind. 2020)
(granting state’s motion for summary judgment regarding ultrasound requirement on the
grounds that it does not impose a significant burden).
60. Statutes requiring disclosure of the reversibility of medication abortion have,
however, been uniformly enjoined. Am. Med. Ass’n v. Stenehjem, 412 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1151
(D.N.D. 2019) (enjoining abortion reversal disclosure as being “misleading”); Planned
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Beyond these formal legal challenges, numerous scholars of constitutional law
have also offered more nuanced perspectives on the constitutionality of laws
compelling physician speech, particularly in the context of abortion.61
C. Scholarly Criticism
Abortion disclosure laws have been challenged beyond their constitutional
implications. Scholars of law, public policy, medicine, ethics, and feminist studies
have developed a wide body of literature addressing the ways in which abortion
disclosure laws are problematic as a matter of policy. While a full overview of the
scholarly debate is beyond the scope of this Article, I wish to highlight two major
points of concern.
First, as explained in Section II.A infra, these laws modify the standard of care
for informed consent in ways that conflict with the medical community’s own
practices. This is problematic from a tort perspective, given that standards of care are
traditionally grounded in the practices of reasonable physicians. However, it also
poses ethical concerns. Many commentators in medicine, medical ethics, and health
policy argue that the principles of medical ethics underlying informed consent—
autonomy, beneficence, justice, non-maleficence—are violated when states compel
doctors to communicate some types of information about abortion.62 Prominent
professional medical associations have expressed similar concerns. The American
Congress on Obstetrics and Gynecology’s Committee on Ethics criticizes abortion
disclosure laws as interfering with physicians’ ethical obligations, including their
obligations to have “open, honest, and confidential communications with their
patient[]” and to counsel patients “according to the best currently available medical

Parenthood of Tenn. & N. Miss. v. Slatery, No. 3:20-CV-00740, 2021 WL 765606, at *17
(M.D. Tenn. Feb. 26, 2021) (enjoining abortion reversal disclosure on the grounds that it is
untruthful and/or misleading). See also Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Brnovich, 172 F.
Supp. 3d 1075, 1098–99 (D. Ariz. 2016) (finding that abortion providers have standing to
challenge abortion reversal disclosure as “false, misleading, and/or irrelevant”).
61. See, e.g., Post, supra note 28 (analyzing the First Amendment implications of abortion
informed consent laws); Helen Norton, Pregnancy and the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2417, 2418–31 (2018) (offering an alternative view of the First Amendment’s protections
as focusing on the interests of the listener, rather than the speaker); Tobin, supra note 13, at
114 (arguing that disclosures of “specific factual claims” should be “subject to non-deferential
judicial review of their accuracy and fairness”); Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment
Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 939–1016 (2009) (using abortion
counseling and disclosure laws to argue for a listener-based First Amendment right against
compelled listening); Haupt, supra note 44 (arguing that First Amendment protection of
professional speech should be grounded in the understanding of professionals as “knowledge
communities”); Coleman, supra note 53 (arguing that courts should apply intermediate
scrutiny to laws interfering with physician-patient communications, and consider whether the
laws are reasonably related to the government’s interest in upholding the quality of medical
practice).
62. See Minkoff & Marshall, supra note 13, at 21 (arguing that abortion disclosure laws
violate patient autonomy); Vanderwalker, supra note 13, at 4, 33–39 (arguing that “in addition
to their shortcomings when judged by the standards of the Constitution, biased counseling
laws have serious problems when judged by the standards of medical ethics”).
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evidence and the physician’s professional medical judgment.”63 In a 2013 article in
the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, one hundred professors of
obstetrics and gynecology argued that abortion informed consent laws developed in
the forty years since Roe v. Wade have “interfered in the consent process by requiring
that irrelevant, even untrue information, be given by the physician.”64 The American
Medical Association has likewise opposed “procedure-specific” informed consent
requirements.65
Second, feminist legal scholarship has highlighted abortion informed consent
laws as yet another example of “abortion exceptionalism,” where state actors regulate
abortion in ways that would be inconceivable in any other context.66 Much of this
exceptionalism, according to scholars, is driven by patriarchal and paternalistic
perspectives regarding women’s ability to make their own decisions,67 as well as

63. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS COMM. ON ETHICS, ACOG
COMMITTEE OPINION NUMBER 819: INFORMED CONSENT AND SHARED DECISION MAKING IN
OBSTETRICS
AND
GYNECOLOGY
34,
38
(2021),
https://www.acog.org//media/project/acog/acogorg/clinical/files/committee-opinion/articles/2021/02/informedconsent-and-shared-decision-making-in-obstetrics-and-gynecology.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QRL2-TVAZ].
64. One Hundred Professors of Obstetrics and Gynecology, A Statement on Abortion by
100 Professors of Obstetrics: 40 Years Later, 88 CONTRACEPTION 568, 570 (2013); see also
Jody Steinauer & Carolyn Sufrin, Legislating Abortion Care, 16 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS
266 (2014) (commenting on the One Hundred Professors Statement, and arguing that requiring
that “clinicians give inaccurate information to patients is, to say the least, unethical”).
65. Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Opposition to “Procedure-Specific” Informed Consent, House
of Delegates Resolution 226 (passed 1999, reaffirmed 2021), https://policysearch.amaassn.org/policyfinder/detail/226%20A-99?uri=2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-2623.xml
[https://perma.cc/325C-X87A] (“Our AMA opposes legislative measures that would impose
procedure-specific requirements for informed consent or a waiting period for any legal
medical procedure.”).
66. See Borgmann, supra note 42, at 1048 (defining “abortion exceptionalism” as “a term
that has been used to describe the tendency of legislatures and courts to subject abortion to
unique, and uniquely burdensome, rules”); Corbin, supra note 15, at 1176 (describing one
form of “abortion distortion” as the development of abortion jurisprudence where “normal
[constitutional] doctrine does not apply”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin,
Constitutional Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 61 (2019) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s conclusion in NIFLA was at odds with
Casey, and that it reflects judicial hostility to abortion rights rather than any consistent
constitutional doctrine).
67. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1726, 1730 (2007) (describing Supreme Court
abortion jurisprudence as being grounded in the belief that women’s decision-making is
“coerced or confused,” and that women are unable to make rational decisions on their own);
Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1193, 1221 (2010) (describing the rationale behind Casey’s acceptance of informed
consent and spousal consent requirements as “protect[ing] women from psychological
injury”); Vanderwalker, supra note 13, at 13 (pointing to Casey and Carhart as exemplifying
the Supreme Court’s “willingness to accept the notion that women’s decision-making abilities
are deficient”). Issues of paternalism in reproductive health care also arise in the context of
the rights of pregnant persons to make choices about medical treatment during pregnancy and
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unfounded assumptions about women’s emotional responses to abortion.68
According to Maya Manian, the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence (and
particularly its discussion of informed decision-making in Carhart) “exposes
abortion law’s treatment of women as less capable decision-makers.”69 Likewise,
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles criticizes abortion laws as being grounded in unfounded
stereotypes about women’s emotional stability and assumptions about the “pull of
motherhood.”70
Both these arguments speak to concerns about the state’s involvement in the
doctor-patient relationship, and in particular, its lack of deference to professional and
personal values. Legislatures that have passed abortion informed consent laws have
effectively indicated that they trust neither the medical judgment of health care
providers, nor the personal judgment of women seeking abortions.
II. MODIFYING THE ELEMENTS OF TORT LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
Under common law, physicians who breach their duty to secure a patient’s
informed consent are liable for damages. To prove an informed consent claim, much
like a claim for traditional medical malpractice, a plaintiff must demonstrate duty,
breach, causation in fact, proximate causation, and compensable injury.
Abortion informed consent laws have been most widely criticized for modifying
the scope of the physician’s substantive duty to disclose.71 However, this author’s
analysis of state laws suggests that they do more than that—most of the statutes seem
to completely eliminate the plaintiff’s burden of proving causation in fact and
proximate causation. Scholarship has not yet recognized that abortion disclosure
laws impose liability on physicians by apparently jettisoning two foundational
elements of a tort cause of action. This Article explains this exceptional and
dangerous legal strategy and demonstrates why it should be resisted.
Notably, there are several other ways in which abortion disclosure laws deviate
from traditional tort law principles that cannot be addressed in an article of this
length. Among other things, the laws may impose fixed statutory damages in addition
to compensatory damages (and sometimes treble damages);72 establish statutes of

birth. See generally Jamie R. Abrams, The Illusion of Autonomy in Women’s Medical
Decision-Making, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17 (2014); Rebecca A. Spence, Abandoning Women
to Their Rights: What Happens When Feminist Jurisprudence Ignores Birthing Rights, 19
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 75 (2012).
68. See Corbin, supra note 15, at 1178 (arguing that many abortion regulations are based
on the “alleged deleterious effect of abortion on women’s mental health”).
69. Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion DecisionMaking, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 255 (2009).
70. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal
Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, at 592–95
(2011).
71. See infra Section II.A.
72. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(L)(2) (2021) (imposing statutory damages of $5000
or three times the cost of the abortion, whichever is greater); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.29
(2019) (imposing a $1000 civil fine for violations of consent requirements); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-6705(q)(2)(C) (West 2014) (imposing statutory damages equal to three times the cost of
the abortion); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-03.2 (West 1991) (imposing punitive damages
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limitations that differ from those of traditional negligence or malpractice actions;73
prohibit patients from waiving their right to informed consent;74 and establish breach
of a physician’s disclosure duty to a patient as grounds for liability to family
members,75 including unrelated torts, like family disruption.76 These issues are ripe
for future research, and should be examined further by torts scholars.
A. Duty and Scope of Disclosure
Numerous scholars have challenged abortion disclosure laws on the grounds that
they deviate from the common law standard regarding the type of information
doctors have a duty to disclose.77 Traditionally, common law imposes a duty to
disclose the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis, the medical risks and benefits of the
proposed treatment, and the medical risks and benefits of alternative treatments.

of $10,000 or $5,000, depending on the violation, and treble actual damages); 18 PA. STAT.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3217 (West 1988) (imposing statutory damages of $5,000); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-22 (2011) (imposing punitive damages of $10,000 or $5,000,
depending on the violation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-60 (imposing statutory damages
of $10,000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(6)(b) (West 2016) (imposing punitive damages of not
less than $1,000 nor more than $10,000).
73. For example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(M) (2021) establishes a six-year
statute of limitations.
74. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-61(5) (2012) (“No patient or other person responsible
for making decisions relative to the patient’s care may waive the requirements of this chapter,
and any verbal or written waiver of liability for malpractice or professional negligence arising
from any failure to comply with the requirements of this chapter is void and unenforceable.”).
Cf. FURROW ET AL., supra note 6, at 141 (recognizing that patients have a legal right to waive
their right to informed consent).
75. See infra Section II.B.
76. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.732, 311.735 (West 2019) (establishing that a
physician’s failure to notify a spouse and failure to obtain consent for a minor are prima facie
evidence of “interference with family relations”).
77. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 9, at 1617–20 (identifying several categories of abortion
disclosures that would not be required under traditional informed consent doctrine); Robbins,
supra note 28, at 161 (describing abortion disclosure laws as resulting in “a breed of informed
consent statute that glaringly stands out from all others”); Gold & Nash, supra note 13, at 7–
8 (noting that abortion laws require disclosure of “some information not in keeping with the
fundamental tenets of informed consent”); Lazzarini, supra note 13, at 2189 (referring to South
Dakota’s law as an “informed consent” law, in quotes, and noting that “[t]he law is unique in
ways that should cause concern to physicians, patients, and protectors of the physician-patient
relationship”); Minkoff & Marshall, supra note 13, at 21 (describing abortion disclosure laws
as “replac[ing] the concept of informed consent as a discussion of risks, benefits, and
alternatives with a coercive process focusing almost exclusively on risks, misinformation, and
implied government opprobrium”); Tobin, supra note 13, at 111 (describing abortion laws
requiring disclosure of fetal pain as “abandon[ing] well-settled principles of informed consent
. . . in favor of legislative judgments about what particular facts should be told to patients and
how these facts should be shared”). See also EMW Women’s Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshear,
920 F.3d 421, 438 (6th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that the Supreme Court in Casey upheld
informed consent requirements that the district court found were “directly contrary to alleged
medical-profession custom”).
AND
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However, as described above, many state legislatures have dramatically expanded
the scope of disclosure in the context of informed consent to abortion, requiring
physicians to communicate information that goes far beyond the medical risks and
benefits of the abortion procedure (and its alternative, pregnancy). Although not all
states have taken this approach, there is a risk that these new disclosure requirements
will spill over to be viewed as the national standard of care, even in states without
abortion-specific consent laws.78
There is certainly merit to the argument that the scope of disclosure in informed
consent to abortion deviates from the traditional common law scope of disclosure.
However, as I have previously argued, a more nuanced understanding of informed
consent doctrine suggests that this argument may not serve critics’ purposes as
effectively as they might hope.79 Although “there is a sense of certainty . . . in the
standard litany of informed consent disclosure requirements . . . almost as if the
content of the required disclosures were etched in stone for each procedure[,]” this
is not necessarily an accurate perspective.80 Rather, I have argued, informed consent
is a socially constructed doctrine that is inherently flexible, and necessarily
incorporates some value judgments.81 Common law standards of medical materiality
change over time, and while courts have generally taken a traditional approach to
defining the scope of informed consent disclosure, the doctrine is not static.82 Of
course, it is still possible to challenge many aspects of abortion disclosure laws as
being inconsistent with traditional informed consent disclosure duties—for example,
the requirement that physicians disclose only information that is factual and material,
and the ability of patients to waive consent and/or decline to hear information about
the procedure. However, in light of the evolving common law of informed consent,
legal challenges to the scope of disclosure may be less compelling than they initially
appear.83
B. Factual and Legal Causation
From a tort scholar’s perspective, a particularly problematic aspect of abortion
compelled speech laws—and one that has not yet been addressed in tort law
scholarship—is that they eliminate a plaintiff’s burden of proving causation, which
is fundamental to any negligence claim.
The causation requirements for informed consent claims are somewhat different
from the causation requirements for medical malpractice and other negligence
claims. To prove negligence, a plaintiff must first demonstrate causation in fact—
that the defendant’s breach actually caused the plaintiff’s injury, and that but for that
breach, the plaintiff more likely than not would not have been injured. The plaintiff
must also prove proximate causation, which requires a showing that it was
foreseeable that the defendant’s breach might cause the injury that occurred, such
that it would be justified as a matter of policy to impose liability.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
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In informed consent cases, however, the required elements of causation are treated
somewhat differently. The elements of cause in fact and proximate cause have
developed to require more specific proof that closely aligns with the facts underlying
the informed consent cause of action.
First, the plaintiff-patient in an informed consent case must demonstrate that if
the defendant-physician had made the legally required disclosures, a reasonable
patient would have chosen an alternate course of treatment, and in turn would not
have suffered the injury that occurred. This requirement, commonly referred to as
“decision causation,” tracks factual causation under the traditional but-for test but
approaches it from an objective rather than subjective perspective.84 Second, the
plaintiff must prove that the injury they suffered was a manifestation of the specific
risk the physician failed to disclose (referred to as “injury causation”). This
requirement is similar to the traditional test for proximate causation, requiring proof
that the defendant’s breach was closely connected enough to plaintiff’s injury to
warrant imposition of liability.
While proof of these two elements is required in any common law action for
informed consent, statutes that establish physician liability for failure to
communicate state-mandated messages about abortion are drafted so broadly as to
negate these two requirements. Few of the abortion informed consent statutes
explicitly require plaintiffs to prove any causal connection between the doctor’s act
and the plaintiff’s injury. A plaintiff can recover damages simply by claiming that an
abortion or attempted abortion took place, and that the physician did not disclose
information required under the statute, regardless of whether the disclosure would
have prevented the plaintiff’s injury.
1. Causation in Fact
As noted above, the cause in fact requirement in informed consent cases differs
from that in traditional malpractice actions. Rather than asking whether, as a factual
matter, correction of the defendant’s breach would more likely than not have
prevented this plaintiff’s injury, courts in informed consent cases view this question
through a theoretical lens. They instead ask whether appropriate disclosure by the
defendant would have caused an objectively reasonable patient to make a different
choice regarding medical treatment. This is commonly referred to as “decision
causation,” and is the standard in all but four states.85

84. See infra Section II.B.
85. Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, Revitalizing Informed Consent and Protecting Patient
Autonomy: An Appeal to Abandon Objective Causation, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 697, 709–18 (2012)
(describing the objective decision causation requirement in informed consent cases); see also
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 34
(1986) (describing the subjective causation rule as having been “largely . . . neglected in
judicial opinion and legal commentary”). Many scholars have criticized the objective decision
causation standard as inconsistent with informed consent doctrine’s theoretical grounding in
the principle of patient autonomy, but those criticisms have not impacted the legal standard.
See, e.g., Tenenbaum, supra, at 717–19; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra, at 35. Commentators
have also challenged the objective decision causation standard as having significant practical
challenges. See, e.g., Tenenbaum, supra, at 720–25 (arguing that given the breadth of
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Consider a patient with severe back pain who is choosing between invasive
surgery and medical management using prescription painkillers. The patient’s doctor
negligently fails to disclose that the prescription painkiller’s side effects include
nausea and vomiting. Unaware of these risks, the patient chooses to proceed with
medical management of their back pain. The patient experiences nausea and
vomiting as a result of the medication and brings an informed consent claim to
recover damages for these injuries. To prove causation in fact, they must demonstrate
that if an objectively reasonable patient had been told of these risks, that prudent
patient would have chosen surgery instead of medical management. It is insufficient
for the patient to show that they personally would have chosen surgery if they had
known of the prescription’s side effects. Thus, if a fact finder determines that most
reasonable patients would prefer to take a medication with these side effects than to
undergo invasive surgery, an injured patient who claims they would have made a
different choice has no remedy.86
Abortion compelled speech laws, however, do not require plaintiffs to make a
showing of decision causation, either objective or subjective. These laws entitle an
injured patient to damages for a physician’s breach of informed consent without
requiring the patient to prove that a reasonable patient (or even this patient) would
have proceeded differently had their physician made the full disclosures required by
statute.
Consider a patient who is planning to terminate her pregnancy and whose
physician is in the process of securing her consent to the procedure. Imagine that the
physician makes those disclosures that are traditionally required under the common
law of informed consent—about the medical risks and benefits of abortion and its
alternative, pregnancy—but fails to communicate some of the information required
by state statute. Perhaps the physician fails to provide information about the fetus’s
status as a “human being,” about the risk of suicide, or about the availability of
adoption services. Many statutes would allow the patient to recover damages
associated with the abortion, even if the undisclosed information would have had no
impact on a reasonable patient’s decision.87
Of the states with abortion-specific physician disclosure statutes, all but three are
silent as to causation in fact. Most simply state that a physician’s failure to comply
with the statutory informed consent requirements provide a basis for tort recovery.88

treatment options and the variety of patient perspectives on these options, most informed
consent claims will fail the objective causation test); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cogen,
Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U.
ILL. L. REV. 607, 626 (1988) (arguing that regardless of the model of causation, psychological
research about human decision-making suggests that the issue of causation is not practically
justiciable).
86. See Tenenbaum, supra note 85, at 712–13 (“Given this objective standard, a patient
could be denied relief even if: (1) the information he received from the physician was totally
deficient, (2) the patient himself would not have chosen the surgery if he had been informed
of the risks and alternatives, and (3) he was severely injured.”).
87. See infra note 88.
88. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-10 (2009) (“[F]ailure to comply with the requirements of this
chapter shall: (1) Provide a basis for a civil action for compensatory and punitive damages . . .
based on a claim that the act was a result of simple negligence, gross negligence, wantonness,
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willfulness, intention, or other legal standard of care . . . (3) Provide a basis for recovery for
the woman for the wrongful death of the child[.]”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(L)
(2009) (“A civil action filed pursuant to subsection K of this section . . . may be based on a
claim that failure to obtain informed consent was a result of simple negligence, gross
negligence, wantonness, wilfulness, intention or any other legal standard of care.”); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-16-1710(a) (2015) (“In addition to any remedies available under the common
law or statutory law of this state, failure to comply with the requirements of this subchapter
shall provide a basis for a: (1) Civil malpractice action for actual and punitive damages . . . .”);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-618(1) (West 2015) (providing that a plaintiff “may maintain an action
for actual damages against the person who in knowing or reckless violation of section 18-617,
Idaho Code, attempted or performed the abortion[,]” where section § 18-617 regulates
chemical abortions and incorporates § 18-609 informed consent requirements); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 146B.3 (West 2015) (providing that a plaintiff “may maintain an action against the
physician who performed the abortion in intentional or reckless violation of this chapter for
actual damages”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6710(a)(1) (West 2014) (requiring that stateprovided documentation inform patients that “any physician who performs an abortion upon
a woman without her informed consent may be liable to her for damages”); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-6705(q) (West 2014) (establishing that, in the context of abortion on minors, a “custodial
parent or legal guardian of the minor may pursue civil remedies against [those] who violate
the rights of parents, legal guardian or the minor as set forth in this section”); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1061.29(B)–(C) (2019) (establishing that informed consent violations will result in “a
civil fine of one thousand dollars per incidence or occurrence . . . . In addition to whatever
remedies are otherwise available under the law of this state, failure to comply with the
provisions of this Chapter shall: (1) Provide a basis for a civil malpractice action . . . (3)
Provide a basis for recovery for the woman for the death of her unborn child.”); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.4247(1) (West 2003) (providing that a person upon whom an abortion has been
performed or attempted without the physician’s compliance with statutory informed consent
requirements “may maintain an action against the person who performed the abortion in
knowing or reckless violation of sections 145.4241 to 145.4249 for actual and
punitive damages”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-307(1) (1995) (“A person who performs an
abortion in knowing or reckless violation of this chapter may be liable for actual and punitive
damages.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.88(a) (West 2011) (establishing that a plaintiff
“may maintain an action for damages against the person who performed the abortion in
knowing or reckless violation of this Article”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-03.2 (West
1991) (“Any person upon whom an abortion has been performed without informed consent as
required by [statutes] may maintain an action against the person who performed the abortion
for ten thousand dollars in punitive damages and treble whatever actual damages the plaintiff
may have sustained.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56(H) (West 2021) (“[A]ny physician
who performs or induces an abortion with actual knowledge that [informed consent
requirements] have not been satisfied or with a heedless indifference as to whether those
conditions have been satisfied is liable in compensatory and exemplary damages in a civil
action.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3f (West 2012) (providing that a plaintiff “may
commence a civil action against the abortion provider, against the prescriber of any drug or
chemical intended to induce abortion, and against any person or entity which referred the
woman to the abortion provider or prescriber and which knew or reasonably should have
known that the abortion provider or prescriber had acted in violation of [informed consent
provisions of the Oklahoma Statutes] for actual damages and, in cases of gross negligence, for
punitive damages”); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3217 (West 1988) (“Any physician
who knowingly violates any of the provisions of section 3204 or 3205 [relating to informed
consent] shall . . . be civilly liable to his patient for any damages caused thereby and, in
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And the three state statutes that explicitly speak to the issue of causation significantly
deviate from the traditional requirement that a plaintiff in an informed consent suit
prove objective decision causation. Alaska requires the plaintiff to prove decision
causation under a subjective standard.89 Nebraska90 and South Dakota91 relieve the
plaintiff of this burden by establishing that a physician’s non-disclosure of statutorily
required information creates a rebuttable presumption of subjective decision
causation.
Alaska’s abortion informed consent statute imposes liability only if the plaintiff
can prove that, “but for [the physician’s] failure [to disclose], the person would not
have consented to the abortion procedure.”92 This subjective decision causation
standard is less stringent than the objective standard traditionally used in informed
consent cases, but at least it requires some proof of causation on the part of the
plaintiff. Interestingly, Alaska’s statute seems drafted specifically to avoid concerns
about informed consent claims being brought based on a physician’s failure to
disclose state-mandated information that may not be relevant to the abortion
decision. Alaska’s statute says that consent is proven when the patient certifies in
writing that a physician has provided either information drafted by the Department
of Health and Social Services and available on the internet,93 or “information about

addition, shall be liable to his patient for punitive damages in the amount of $5,000.”); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-15-218(1) (West 2020) (providing that, in the context of chemical abortions
only, a plaintiff “may bring an action against the person who performed the abortion in
knowing or reckless violation of this act [relating to informed consent] for actual and
punitive damages”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(6) (West 2015) (“A person who violates
[informed consent provisions] is liable to the woman on or for whom the abortion was
performed or induced for damages arising out of the performance or inducement of the
abortion, including damages for personal injury and emotional and psychological distress.”
This statute also establishes liability to fathers and grandparents of the unborn child).
89. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.16.010(h) (“A physician or other health care provider
is liable for failure to obtain the informed consent of a person as required under AS 18.16.060
if the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the provider has failed to
inform the person of the common risks and reasonable alternatives to the proposed abortion
procedure and that, but for that failure, the person would not have consented to the abortion
procedure.”)
90. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.11(1) (“In determining the liability of the physician
and the validity of the consent of a pregnant woman, the failure to comply with the
requirements of section 28-327 shall create a rebuttable presumption that the pregnant woman
would not have undergone the recommended abortion had section 28-327 been complied with
by the physician.”)
91. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-61(1) (“The failure to comply with the requirements
of this chapter relative to obtaining consent for the abortion shall create a rebuttable
presumption that if the pregnant mother had been informed or assessed in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter, she would have decided not to undergo the abortion.”)
92. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.16.010(h) (West 2020).
93. Id. § 18.05.032. This includes information about (among other things) pregnancy
counseling, adoption agencies, post-abortion counseling, eligibility for medical assistance, the
process of obtaining child support, description of fetal development including photographs,
and “objective, unbiased information that is reviewed and approved for medical accuracy by
recognized obstetrical and gynecological specialists” about the risks of abortion, the risks of
pregnancy and childbirth, and the impact of alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs on fetal
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the nature and risks of undergoing or not undergoing the proposed procedure that a
reasonable patient would consider material to making a voluntary and informed
decision of whether to undergo the procedure.”94 However, the liability provisions
that establish the subjective causation requirement impose liability only if the
physician breaches the duty to inform the patient “of the common risks and
reasonable alternatives to the proposed abortion procedure.”95 In other words, an
Alaska physician will not be liable for breach of informed consent if they accurately
disclose the risks and benefits of abortion but fail to share the state-mandated
materials.
The other two states with statutes that explicitly speak to causation in an abortion
informed consent case are Nebraska and South Dakota. Their statutes establish that
a physician’s failure to comply with the statutory disclosure requirements create a
rebuttable presumption of subjective decision causation—that is, a presumption that
the woman bringing the claim would not have undergone the abortion had these
disclosures been made.96 These statutes are far less stringent than a requirement that
the plaintiff affirmatively prove objective decision causation, or even (as Alaska
does) subjective decision causation.97

development. Id.
94. Id. § 18.16.060(b).
95. “A physician or other health care provider is liable for failure to obtain the informed
consent of a person as required under AS 18.16.060 if the claimant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the provider has failed to inform the person of the common
risks and reasonable alternatives to the proposed abortion procedure and that, but for that
failure, the person would not have consented to the abortion procedure.” Id. § 18.16.010(h).
96. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-61(1) (2011) (“The failure to comply with the
requirements of this chapter relative to obtaining consent for the abortion shall create a
rebuttable presumption that if the pregnant mother had been informed or assessed in
accordance with the requirements of this chapter, she would have decided not to undergo
the abortion.”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.11(1) (West 2010) (“In determining
the liability of the physician and the validity of the consent of a pregnant woman, the failure
to comply with the requirements of section 28-327 shall create a rebuttable presumption that
the pregnant woman would not have undergone the recommended abortion had section 28327 been complied with by the physician.”).
97. Interestingly, when it comes to causation, South Dakota maintains a subjective
standard; however, the scope of the doctor’s disclosure duties is based on the objective
“reasonable patient” standard. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1.7 (2005) (“The South Dakota
common law cause of action for medical malpractice informed consent claims based upon the
reasonable patient standard is reaffirmed and is hereby expressly declared to apply to all
abortion procedures. The duty of a physician to disclose all facts about the nature of the
procedure, the risks of the procedure, and the alternatives to the procedure that a reasonable
patient would consider significant to her decision of whether to undergo or forego the
procedure applies to all abortions. Nothing in § 34-23A-1, §§ 34-23A-1.2 to 34-23A-1.7,
inclusive, § 34-23A-10.1, and § 34-23A-10.3 may be construed to render any of the
requirements otherwise imposed by common law inapplicable to abortion procedures or
diminish the nature or the extent of those requirements. The disclosure requirements expressly
set forth in § 34-23A-1, §§ 34-23A-1.2 to 34-23A-1.7, inclusive, § 34-23A-10.1, and § 3423A-10.3 are an express clarification of, and are in addition to, those common law disclosure
requirements.”).
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Interestingly, Nebraska’s statute hints at the traditional objective causation
standard for informed consent, effectively granting an affirmative defense if the
physician can prove that the undisclosed information would not be relevant to a
reasonable person’s abortion decision. A physician in Nebraska can defend against
abortion informed consent liability by demonstrating that they “omitted the contested
information because statistically validated surveys of the general population of
women of reproductive age, conducted within the three years before or after the
contested abortion, demonstrate that less than five percent of women would consider
the contested information to be relevant to an abortion decision.”98 In practice,
however, this defense would be almost impossible to secure, given that such
statistical research does not exist.
South Dakota’s statute also recognizes that the presumption of causation is not
absolute and can be rebutted.99 In such cases, the statute instructs the finder of fact
to determine whether causation has been satisfied, taking into account the plaintiff’s
“personal background and personality, her physical and psychological condition, and
her personal philosophical, religious, ethical, and moral beliefs.”100 In effect, South
Dakota doubles down on subjective decision causation—first establishing a
presumption that it has been satisfied, and alternatively instructing the factfinder to
look carefully at the plaintiff’s subjective characteristics to determine whether she
would have consented had she been given the required information.
In sum, the civil liability provisions of most abortion informed consent laws
eliminate one of the fundamental legal requirements for an informed consent suit—
proving that the disclosure is so significant that it would have caused a reasonable
person to make a different decision. Most do not require a plaintiff to prove any
causal relationship between the physician’s nondisclosure and the patient’s injury,
and none apply the objective decision causation test traditionally used in informed
consent cases.
If traditional informed consent actions took the approach that abortion informed
consent laws take, physicians who fail to satisfy their disclosure duties would be
liable any time their patients are injured as a result of the recommended treatment,
regardless of whether the undisclosed information would have been relevant to a
patient making that choice. Returning to the hypothetical at the start of this Section
clarifies why such an approach would be problematic. The patient with back pain
who chooses to take a prescription painkiller after the physician neglects to inform
them of its side effects would be able to successfully recover against the physician if
they experience those side effects, regardless of causation. Even if a reasonably
prudent patient would consider the risk of nausea and vomiting to be reasonable in
comparison to the risks associated with back surgery—and even if this particular
patient, if informed of these risks, would have chosen to take the prescription rather
than have surgery—the physician would still be liable. This is simply not how
informed consent law was designed to operate.

98. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.11(5) (West 2016).
99. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-61(1). That said, the statute does not specify how this
presumption might be rebutted. See id.
100. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-61(3) (Supp. 2020).
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2. Proximate Causation
The proximate cause requirement in informed consent actions under common law
is also more specific than in traditional negligence actions. In a negligence action,
the assessment of whether proximate cause has been satisfied is a policy-based
determination, evaluating whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of
risks that were foreseeable as a result of breach of duty. In an informed consent case,
however, a plaintiff cannot recover unless they demonstrate that the physical injury
they suffered was a manifestation of the specific medical risk that the physician failed
to disclose. As explained in one of the most widely cited cases relating to the
informed consent cause of action, Canterbury v. Spence, “[a]n unrevealed risk that
should have been made known must materialize, for otherwise the omission,
however unpardonable, is legally without consequence.”101 In other words, if a
physician breaches their duty to disclose a risk associated with the treatment the
patient is considering, the patient only has a right of recovery if that particular risk
materializes. If the patient is injured in another way—by a different sort of risk than
the one that was not disclosed, or by a dignitary rather than physical harm—the
patient cannot recover in an informed consent action.
To illustrate this principle, consider again the patient who is choosing between
medical and surgical treatment of their severe back pain. Under the common law of
informed consent, the patient’s physician must disclose the risks and benefits of both
options. In this example, imagine that that the physician fails to satisfy this duty: he
correctly informs the patient that the surgery has a ten percent risk of causing
paralysis, but fails to disclose that the prescription painkillers used for medical
management of the pain have a ten percent risk of causing nausea and vomiting. If
the patient chooses surgery and becomes paralyzed as a result, he cannot recover for
his injuries in an informed consent suit, because the risk that the doctor failed to
disclose (nausea and vomiting) was not the risk that caused the patient’s injury
(paralysis). Only if the doctor failed to disclose the risk of paralysis will the paralyzed
patient have a right of recovery in informed consent. Alternatively, imagine that the
patient suffers no physical injury as a result of the procedure; even if they allege that
they suffered serious emotional or dignitary harm when they learned of the
nondisclosure, informed consent law would not provide grounds for recovery.
Applying this principle to the abortion context, a common law informed consent
action should succeed only if the injury for which the patient is seeking a remedy is
a risk that the physician had a legal duty to disclose. For example, one of the risks of
dilation and curettage is the development of scar tissue on the uterine wall.102 If the
physician fails to disclose that risk when securing the patient’s consent to abortion,

101. 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In full, the Canterbury court states that
“nonfulfillment of the physician’s obligation to disclose alone” does not establish liability.
Rather, “[a]n unrevealed risk that should have been made known must materialize, for
otherwise the omission, however unpardonable, is legally without consequence. Occurrence
of the risk must be harmful to the patient, for negligence unrelated to injury is nonactionable.”
Id.
102. Dilation and Curettage: Risks and Benefits, CLEV. CLINIC,
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/treatments/4110-dilation-and-curettage-d--c
[https://perma.cc/4FHU-VDWQ] (Mar. 15, 2021).
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and the patient subsequently suffers uterine scarring—a manifestation of the
undisclosed risk—the physician will be liable under common law.
As noted in Section II.A, however, in states with abortion informed consent
statutes, the scope of compelled disclosures is extremely broad. Physicians may be
required to tell patients that abortion is correlated with an increased risk of suicide,
that medication abortion is reversible, and that fathers have a legal obligation to pay
child support, among other things. Under traditional theories of informed consent, a
patient could not pursue civil recovery against a physician who failed to disclose this
information unless she were injured in a way that was proximately connected to that
specific nondisclosure. For example, a patient who chose to have an abortion despite
not being told that abortion increases the risk of breast cancer would have a common
law right of recovery only if she subsequently developed breast cancer. If she suffered
other ill effects—physical injury as a result of the abortion, the death of the fetus, or
emotional distress—the doctor’s breach would not be actionable, and tort law would
provide no remedy.
However, abortion informed consent statutes are drafted so broadly that they do
not limit a patient’s recovery to situations in which proximate cause is satisfied. A
patient who chose to have an abortion despite not being told that abortion increases
the risk of breast cancer would have a statutory right of recovery simply on the basis
of that nondisclosure, regardless of the injury she alleged. Not one of the abortion
informed consent statutes reviewed by this author requires that an undisclosed risk
manifest itself in order for a patient to have a right of recovery against her physician
for nondisclosure. In fact, many statutes explicitly identify, as compensable injuries,
harms that are unrelated to the information that physicians are required to disclose
under state law.
For example, many state statutes provide that a physician’s failure to comply with
statutory disclosure requirements will provide a basis for “wrongful death”
recovery.103 The injury identified is the death of the fetus.104 Under common law, as
described above, the only situation in which a woman would be able to recover for
this injury in connection with an informed consent breach would be if the physician
failed to disclose that abortion causes the death of the fetus. But the broad language
of abortion informed consent statutes has no such limitation.105 A physician who
failed to make a statutorily mandated disclosure that pregnant women are eligible for
Medicaid benefits, for example, would be liable for the death of the fetus, a risk that
the woman was fully aware of.
Furthermore, some state statutes impose liability on physicians for damages
associated with psychological or emotional distress, even in the absence of physical
injury. Nebraska’s law, for example, states that “[t]he absence of physical injury shall

103. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-10(3) (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.07(2) (West
2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3f (West 2016).
104. ALA. CODE § 26-23A-10(3) (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.29(C)(3) (Supp. 2021);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.07(2) (West 2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3f (West
2016); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-60 (Supp. 2020) (granting a civil remedy for
violation of informed consent requirements “in addition to the amounts that the [plaintiff] may
be entitled to receive under any common law or statutory provisions, including but not limited
to the wrongful death statutes of this state”).
105. See supra Section I.A.
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not preclude an award of noneconomic damages including pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, psychological trauma, loss of
society or companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, or humiliation
associated with the abortion.”106 Kentucky takes the same approach.107 Other states
explicitly permit recovery for physical injuries and emotional distress but do not limit
emotional distress recovery to situations where physical injury has occurred.108 In
states that impose liability for informed consent failures as part of “attempted”
abortion, this could mean that a woman who underwent the informed consent
process, failed to receive some state-mandated information, and ultimately ended up
not terminating her pregnancy would be able to sue her doctor for damages.109 Once
again, this is at odds with the common law of informed consent, which requires proof
of physical injury—manifestation of the non-disclosed medical risk—as an element
of liability.110
Finally, some abortion disclosure laws permit spouses and/or parents of pregnant
women seeking abortions to recover for informed consent violations.111 These are

106. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.11(2) (West 2021).
107. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.735(3) (West 2019) (awarding
“punitive damages or damages for emotional distress, even if unaccompanied by physical
complications”).
108. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(L)(1) (2018) (referring to damages for
“psychological” and “emotional . . . injuries”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(q)(2)(A) (2018)
(allowing parents of unemancipated minors to recover for “psychological” injuries caused by
informed consent violations); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3f (West 2016) (referring to
“damages for the mental anguish and emotional distress”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(6) (West
2015) (referring to damages for “emotional and psychological distress”).
109. See infra Section III.C.
110. To be sure, some legal scholars have argued that requiring physical harm for informed
consent recovery fails to address the true injury—loss of autonomy in medical decisionmaking. Some argue that the dignitary harm of being denied key information material to a
medical decision should, on its own, be grounds for recovery. See, e.g., Alan Meisel, A
“Dignitary Tort” as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed
Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 210 (1988); Erin Sheley, Rethinking Injury: The Case
of Informed Consent, 2015 BYU L. REV. 63 (2015). However, at this point, these arguments
remain purely academic. Courts continue to require physical injury as an element of informed
consent claims, and this requirement has not been eliminated by statute in any other context
besides abortion.
111. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(K) (2018) (claim by the “father of the unborn
child” if married to the mother, and the “maternal grandparents of the unborn child” if the
mother was a minor); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-618(1) (West 2016) (claim by “the father of the
unborn child” if married to the mother, and “a maternal grandparent of the unborn child” if
the mother is deceased); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(q)(1) (2016) (claim by the “custodial
parent or legal guardian” of a minor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-307(1) (2019) (claim by “the
father” and “the grandparent” of the unborn child if the woman “is under 18 years of age or is
physically or mentally incapacitated”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-327.04, -327.07 (West
2021) (claim by “the parent or guardian” of a minor); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3f
(West 2016) (claim by “the parent or guardian” of a minor); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A22 (Supp. 2020) (claim by the parent of a minor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-208(l) (2016)
(claim by “the grandparent of the unborn child” if the mother is a minor or deceased); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 253.10(6) (West 2015) (claim by the “father” and “any grandparent of” of the
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persons who are not involved in the informed consent conversation between doctor
and patient, are not receiving medical treatment, and have no risk of physical injury
as a result of the abortion procedure. Moreover, in some cases, the interests of these
parties may be at odds with the interests of the woman seeking the abortion. If the
physician performing the abortion fails to disclose any of the state-mandated
information, no matter how immaterial it is to the woman’s decision, and even if the
decision was the woman’s own, these third parties will be able to recover for
emotional harm and other injuries. In no other context that this author is aware of
does an informed consent violation subject a health care provider to liability to
someone other than the patient making the treatment choice, let alone a treatment
choice that is constitutionally protected from government interference.
These compelled speech laws eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff
demonstrate a proximate causal connection between the physician’s failure to
disclose a medical risk associated with the procedure and the manifestation of that
particular risk as a physical injury.
C. Injury and Damages
A final concern about abortion disclosure laws—related to the causation concerns
above—is that some could be interpreted to impose liability for informed consent
breaches even in the absence of any compensable injury.112
Many states impose liability on physicians who perform an abortion or
“attempted” abortion without making the state-mandated informed consent
disclosures.113 However, the statutes do not define what constitutes an “attempted”
abortion. Nor do the statutes explicitly recognize the fact that the practice of informed
consent—and the laws requiring it—contemplate the possibility that a patient, after
being informed of a procedure’s risks and benefits, might choose not to go forward
with it.
Imagine, then, a patient who is considering terminating her pregnancy. In
accordance with her state’s law, the physician engages in an informed conversation
with the patient twenty-four hours before the procedure is to be performed. It is
possible that after this conversation, for whatever reason, the patient might rethink
her choice and decide to continue the pregnancy. If, during the informed consent
conversation, the physician failed to make the full disclosures required by state law,
there is a possibility that they might face liability, despite the fact that no abortion
took place and the patient suffered no physical harm.
As noted above, these informed consent statutes do not define “attempted”
abortion. Could the process of engaging in an informed consent conversation with a
patient contemplating abortion be considered a physician’s “attempt” at abortion?
While perhaps unlikely, it is not outside the realm of possibility. One can imagine an
anti-abortion advocate seeking out a physician who provides abortions and engaging

unborn child).
112. See supra Sections II.B.2 and II.C.
113. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-618(1) (West 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145.4247(1) (West 2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-307(2) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
28-327.04 (West 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.88 (West 2020); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 14-02.1-03.2 (West 2017).
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in the informed consent conversation with no intent to go forward with the abortion,
only for the purpose of identifying flaws in a physician’s disclosure for the purposes
of establishing liability. Even if a patient suffers no actual injury, many states impose
fixed statutory damages on disclosure breaches, separate and apart from any
compensatory damages.114 Indeed, the fact that some states explicitly permit abortion
informed consent recovery for purely emotional harms in the absence of physical
injury115 suggests that they contemplate this possibility.
Another context in which liability might be imposed without physical injury was
referenced in Section III.B.2. Many of these statutes allow spouses and/or parents of
women seeking abortions to recover for informed consent violations. In such cases,
doctors will be liable to third parties who are not their patients, who did not receive
medical treatment, and who suffered no physical injury. As previously explained, the
common law of informed consent imposes liability only when a patient can prove
that they suffered physical injury as a result of an undisclosed medical risk. Allowing
spouses and parents of patients to bring informed consent claims without
demonstrating any physical injury is at odds with this doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Abortion laws that impose liability on physicians for failing to communicate statemandated information differ significantly from the traditional common law doctrine
of informed consent, as well as statutes establishing general informed consent
disclosure duties. They impose liability based on a different set of criteria than are
usually applicable in informed consent cases. Perhaps most importantly, they
eliminate the requirement that liability be limited to cases where a plaintiff has
demonstrated both actual causation and proximate causation. These laws are
problematic because they set the stage for future legislation that could, by
dismantling the fundamental elements of negligence law, impose liability on
defendants in order to achieve political and ideological goals.

114. See supra note 72.
115. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-327.11(2) (West 2021) (“The absence of physical
injury shall not preclude an award of noneconomic damages including pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, psychological trauma, loss of society or
companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, or humiliation associated with the
abortion[.]”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.735(3) (West 2019) (awarding
“punitive damages or damages for emotional distress, even if unaccompanied by physical
complications”); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(L)(1) (2018) (providing relief in
the form of “money damages for all psychological, emotional and physical injuries resulting
from the violation”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6705(q)(2)(A) (2018) (granting a cause of action
to parents and guardians of minors without consent, including “money damages for all
injuries, psychological and physical, occasioned by the violation of this section”); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3f (West 2016) (recognizing damages including “damages for the mental
anguish and emotional distress of the plaintiff”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10(6)(a) (West 2015)
(imposing liability “for damages arising out of the performance or inducement of the abortion,
including damages for personal injury and emotional and psychological distress”).
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